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Abstract 
 
This paper uses analysis to explore the staging decision of venture capitalist (VC).Venture capital 
investment opportunities are modelled as real options with multiple volatilities by Yao-Wen Hsu 
(2008), and the entrepreneur‟s incentive is assumed to maximize the probability of getting funded 
in the next financing round. The paper also analyses the entrepreneur-venture capitalist 
relationship from a Prisoner‟s Dilemma point. The Prisoner's Dilemma framework was developed 
by Cable and Shane (1997) that appears to provide an effective approach for understanding 
entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationships. The approach is used to generate a number of 
testable propositions concerning long term cooperation between entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists. Two celebrated formulae in the option pricing literature are generalized to evaluate 
these real options. We find that staging not only gives the venture capitalist an option to delay 
their investment but also mitigates the agency problem of the entrepreneur undertaking less risky 
activities. Moreover, we find that the venture capitalist tends to stage their investment when the 
expected growth rate of the venture‟s market value is lower.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Venture capital is a major driver of innovation and economic growth in capitalist economies 
(Dushnitsky, 2005). A prominent feature of venture capital investments is staged financing of 
portfolio companies by venture capital firms (Sahlman, 1990) . The paper focuses on the issues of 
financing once the initial investment has been made by Venture capitalist. The research related to 
the initial short listing of the companies, the detailed due diligence, legal contracting in short the 
entire venture capitalist pre selection process is out of scope of our studies.  
In the venture capital setting, entrepreneurs seek funding from venture capitalists for their ideas. 
An entrepreneur has no capital and the firm is typically new or very young. The prominent feature 
of the new high tech industries is the high risk due to the great uncertainty about returns, the lack 
of substantial tangible assets and the lack of a track record in operations. Many high-tech start-ups 
may face many years of negative earnings before they start to see profits. According to 
(Bergemann, 1998), the fraction of such projects for which investors can successfully cash out, 
mostly through Initial Public Offering (IPOs) or trade sale, is 20% or less. Given these conditions, 
banks and other financial institutions are not willing to lend money and financial institution lack 
necessary expertise in investing young high risk companies. The new start up look for venture 
capitalists has to be involved in their activities by offering revenue sharing in the form of equity 
joint ventures in order to obtain necessary funding and to benefit from the venture capitalists‟ 
experience in management and finance. If the venture capital decides to invest in a company, 
rather than investing full amount upfront they prefer investing in stages to control the project and 
reduce the risk. Staged Financing allows venture capitalists to monitor the firm before they make 
refinancing decisions hence preserving the option to abandon the project. This helps venture 
capitalist to avoid throwing their money at bad project and reduce their losses from inefficient 
continuation and creates an exit option for venture capitalists. It also puts the entrepreneur 
indirectly under constant pressure to perform. Staged financing can cause problems depending 
upon the type of financial instrument used to carry out the financing strategy. Firstly, since later 
instalments may not come, the entrepreneur may not have enough incentives to invest effort in 
making his idea a success. Secondly, the entrepreneur may try to boost his early performance in 
order to impress the Venture Capitalist (VC) to make a further investment (Cornelli F, 2003). 
Third, an inadequate initial investment may put the project at risk and the project may fail 
prematurely. Finally, to induce further instalments, the entrepreneur may make a very “sweet” 
deal (Entrepreneur will give away more equity to get financing from venture capitalist) with the 
Venture Capitalist, which may sometimes, even cause the firm to go bankrupt when market 
conditions fluctuate. Hellmann (Hellmann, 1998) argues that the venture capitalists provide 
staged financing in order to avoid risk, but at the same time, staged financing triggers the 
entrepreneur‟s short-term behaviour. To avoid the short term behaviour, the venture capitalist is 
given larger share and hence induces an incentive to monitor and have better control.  
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Venture capitalists  typically have no interest in interfering with the daily management of the 
firm, if it is performing well (Gorman M, 1989), however under certain situation where the firm is 
not doing well to save its investment Venture Capitalist can take control of the firm to either 
replace the top management or to sell the firm. 
Timing for the staging financing is very critical for both venture capital and entrepreneur. 
Developing a product or technology with the venture capital funds within a timely fashion may 
make the difference between survival and going out of business (Dean, 1990). Even if survival is 
not an immediate concern, the entrepreneur may depend upon timely venture capital funding to 
fuel growth. However at every stage of financing venture capitalist is faced with various sources 
of uncertainty and Venture Capitalists have to decide whether to invest or sooner or delay the 
investment. As observed by Kaplan and Strömberg (Kaplan SN, 2003), about 73% of funding 
schemes explicitly include some type of contingency which means future instalments in staged 
financing are generally conditional upon the firm achieving certain business or financial 
objectives, referred to as milestones. Extant research has examined the staged financing from the 
agency perspective (Admati, 1994) (Gompers, 1995).  
While the agency perspective focuses on the Venture Capitalist's need to manage the relationship 
with the entrepreneur, it has largely ignored the broader decision context. Beyond the potential 
self-interest or opportunism on the part of the entrepreneur, the venture capitalist also faces 
market- and project-specific uncertainties as well as competitive pressure that represent important 
factors to consider in the staging decision. 
From the Real option perspective every round of financing venture capitalist has option but not an 
obligation to invest in subsequent round. The issue faced by venture capitalist in each round of 
financing is whether to hold the option in current round or whether to invest in current round and 
hold the option of investing in subsequent round. The current study proposes that this staging 
decision depends on the factors that influence the value of holding the current option to invest vs. 
investing now to obtain the option to invest subsequently. 
Staged financing in recent times is almost being carried out using convertibles. It is being 
assumed that convertibles having its special features will resolve the problems associated with 
stage financing, however it is not clear how convertible can resolve the problems. According to 
analysis by Wang & Wang (Wang, 2009) staged financing using convertibles in dealing with 
various decision events almost achieves the first best. However the paper by Cornelli and Yosha 
(Cornelli F, 2003) emphasize the role of convertibles in dealing with window dressing in staged 
financing. 
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2. Literature review 
 
Using the real option view in staged financing Venture Capitalist faces various uncertainties 
which are resolved with the time. Capital investment are real options –rights but not obligation to 
take some action in future. Real options create economic value by generating future decision 
rights, or more specifically, by offering management the flexibility to act upon new information 
such that the upside economic potential of an investment project is retained while the downside 
losses are contained (Trigeorgis, 1996). 
In staged financing once the Venture Capitalist had invested in portfolio company they have 
option in the next round of financing a) to hold the option to invest b) Invest in next round and get 
an option to invest in subsequent round. From a real options perspective, this staging decision 
depends on the factors that influence the economic value of these two options. The factors that are 
important in staging decision are uncertainty and completion. 
 
 
2.1 Uncertainty 
 
2.1.1 Market uncertainty  
 
Venture capital investments are faced with a lot of uncertainty. As per the study only one third of 
the venture capital investment is successfully exited (Fenn, 1997). According to Cochrane (2005), 
venture capital investments have a mean arithmetic return of 59% but its standard deviation is 
107%. Therefore, vast majority of venture capital investments have a very small chance of a huge 
payoff. 
Uncertainty can be attributed to unexpected market development and an entrepreneur has no 
control on those events hence the uncertainty can be viewed as exogenous to a firm‟s activities. 
This uncertainty does not cause market failure but it does affect the investment strategies of the 
venture capitalist.  
The real option theory suggests that, in the world of uncertainty it is more valuable to venture 
capitalist to hold the option of investing till they get additional information.    
The firm we are referring is start-up or at the early stage and they have business concepts, product 
prototypes, or initial marketing and manufacturing, but have not accumulated substantial tangible 
assets or financial wealth. The firm does not have any track record or any liquid secondary market 
to trade their equity (Wright, 1998). Higher uncertainty will increase the value of holding the 
option in venture capital market because the market uncertainty unfolds which is independent of 
firm‟s activities and venture capitalists can get additional information on the market if they wait 
before they commit any investment. The venture capitalists can then decide as per the market 
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situation whether to abandon the project or to invest immediately and capitalize on any growth 
opportunities. This strategy of holding the option till the market uncertainty unfolds is not 
valuable if the rights and responsibility in the subsequent round is pre-determined and the cost of 
financing is fixed. However Kalpan and Stromberg argue the role and responsibilities outlined in 
the contract are contingent and the cost of finance is never fixed, it varies from round to round as 
investment is done over years. Therefore even if venture capitalist has already gained foothold on 
the portfolio companies by making initial investment, market uncertainty will increase the value 
of current option to invest and its best for venture capitalists to delay the investment.  
Delaying the investment is probably not preferred in venture capital market because the cost of 
investment increases with delay or the option of investment in subsequent round might expire. It 
is best for venture capitalist to invest now and keep the option of investing in further rounds as 
venture capitalists because they cannot generate immediate cash flow to recover investment but 
can profit from subsequent investment opportunities leading to successful exit.    
 
2.1.2 Project specific uncertainty 
 
Extant real option research has suggested two types of uncertainty facing a firm one is exogenous 
uncertainty which is related to market situation and cannot be resolved by organizational effort. 
Second is the endogenous uncertainty that can be influenced by the organizational effort 
(McGrath, 2004). Both these uncertainties effect investment decision differently. Under 
exogenous uncertainty it is beneficial to delay the investment as market conditions unfold and the 
venture capitalists can take sound decisions based on the favourable or unfavourable situations. 
Under endogenous uncertainty which implies the opportunities for information updating and 
learning which encourage the venture capitalist to invest earlier.  
In terms of timing of staged financing two forms of endogenous uncertainty is considered. First, it 
is project-specific uncertainty concerning the costs of completing the project and its potential 
benefits. Second, it is the uncertainty related to behavioural aspect which can be categorized as 
information asymmetry between venture capitalist and entrepreneur coupled with self interest and 
opportunism giving rise to agency problems.  
A venture capital project typically takes years to complete and therefore there are uncertainties 
concerning the cost of completion, project benefits and effort required to complete the project. 
These project related uncertainties can be resolved once the investment proceeds as information 
of the project arrives and there is little value of waiting and delaying the investment. The venture 
capitalist has an option to abandon the project but there is an additional motive to accumulate 
information about the potential benefits of the project by paying the running costs of the venture. 
Venture capitalist is expected to accelerate its funding when information about the costs and 
benefits of the venture project can be obtained through investing. 
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2.2  Competition 
 
Venture capitalists cannot afford to delay their investment when the competition is intense. As 
pointed out by Cochrane (Cochrane, 2005) the venture capital market as a whole is very 
competitive and has very low barriers to entry. The venture capitalist is not alone to fund 
entrepreneurial firm for attractive growth opportunities; even competitors can fund similar 
opportunities and seek to exercise their option. However the venture capitalists have the first right 
of refusal but it cannot prevent competitors from developing other firms with similar growth 
opportunities. Hence the value of option to invest in subsequent round is reduced due to intense 
competition; also delay may increase the cost of nurturing the portfolio company for a successful 
exit. In a highly competitive market it is expected that the venture capitalists speed up the 
investment process.  
 
2.3 Agency concern 
 
Among the other type of endogenous uncertainty there is behavioural uncertainty which is 
primarily focussed on information asymmetry. If the entrepreneur‟s effort is not observed by the 
venture capitalist it hidden action and gives rise to agency problem. If entrepreneur knows more 
about the quality of the company than venture capitalist it‟s thoroughly private information which 
gives rise to potential adverse selection. The venture capitalist is usually in most cases less 
informed about the quality and effort of the entrepreneur since the entrepreneur usually gains 
more in-depth knowledge of her company through running daily operations. In such case venture 
capitalist can mitigate the information asymmetry and agency problem by investing frequently 
and learning about the efforts and quality of the portfolio company. There are several „remedial‟ 
measures to attenuate the hidden information and agency problems. 
 
2.4 Popularity of convertibles 
 
Convertibles are the major instrument in Corporate Finance. According to VentureXpert 
(VentueXpert, 2006), convertibles are the dominant instrument in venture capital financing and 
have become more popular in recent times. In 2005, 93% of investments in all stages were done 
by convertibles (Wang, 2009). Second most popular instrument is debt however it still only 
accounts for very small percentage of financing instrument and its popularity is been decreasing 
in recent years. In 2005, debt financing accounted for only 2.14% of financing in all stages. Many 
studies has been carried out to find the preferences of the financial instrument and are mainly 
based on two approaches firstly asymmetric - information approach and incomplete contract 
approach. 
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2.5 The asymmetric-information approach 
 
The main significance of asymmetric-information approach is that the convertibles gives the firm 
a backdoor to equity and give venture capitalists an opportunity to wait and see if the project is 
worth investing in. According to Myers and Majluf (Myers SC, 1984) a firm knows its value 
better than the venture capitalists and because of this asymmetric information it is likely that 
venture capitalist has undervalued a good firm‟s stock. Convertibles are the best way for the firm 
to sell its equity. Stein (Stein, 1992) has classified firm into three types and the type represents the 
private information of firm. As per Stein (1992) analysis, a bad firm will choose equity financing, 
a medium firm will choose convertible financing and the good firm will choose debt financing. 
This is due to the large cost of financing distress caused by debt. A Bad firm tends to avoid debt 
financing and convertibles as, in the bad situation the firm is not able either to pay back the debt 
or to force conversion in order to eliminate the debt. In contradiction to Stein, Wang & Susheng 
Wang (Wang, 2009) pose an argument saying any firm can employ convertibles in stage finance. 
According to Wang if the firm performs well, the venture capitalist will convert the debt to equity 
and if the firm is not performing well, the venture capitalist will choose to keep the debt and not 
convert to equity and still earn interest. Stein (1992) looks at finance from the firm‟s point of 
view and issues are related to commitment and signalling. However Wang looks at finance from 
both firm and venture capitalist point of view wherein convertible becomes a bargaining outcome 
or a balance of incentives and risks of the two parties. 
Bagella and Becchetti (Bagella M, 1998) gives a refinement to Stein‟s model of asymmetric 
information. They show that a bond-plus-warrant issue is the optimal financing strategy. They 
show that classification of firms in good, medium and bad is problematic and risk and expected 
returns need to consider. Hence a firm‟s manager and investor have two things to consider when 
making any investment decision which are choice of financial instrument and choice of 
investment strategy. In the real world the where a firm is faced with combination of risk and 
expected returns the manager and investor need to choose a combination of the financial 
instrument and the investment strategy. This argument of Bagella and Becchetti is consistent with 
the study by Wang and Wang that convertibles have many advantages of coping itself with many 
decision events. The type of the firm cannot be known before investing hence the venture 
capitalist prefer wait-and-see strategy i.e staged financing and convertibles provide them with the 
option to determine the value of a firm after investment.  
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 2.6 The Incomplete Contract approach 
 
Wang and Wang (2009) base their work on the Incomplete Contract Approach. By this they place 
emphasize on the information revelation during a production process while also allowing for 
exploration of post investment options and opportunities for re-negotiation. More relevantly, this 
approach would apply to staged-financing and equity-sharing mechanisms employed in 
countering corporate financing problems. This approach places stress on risk sharing and moral 
hazard. Consequently risk needs to be shared by both firm and venture capitalist which exist at 
decision events like default, bankruptcy and various possible shocks to the firms. There is need to 
deal with the incentive issue. Therefore the issues involving the incentives for managers and the 
venture capitalist to invest, managers want to continue running the firm even when it is best to 
shut it down, venture capitalists incentive to commit early. The issues of risk and incentives can 
be entangled. Probable case can be the staged financing is used to reduce the risk of the 
investment however staged financing can itself cause agency problems. A dominant view in 
literature on convertibles and incentives is ownership-for-investment view that is pioneered by 
Demski and Sappington (1991) (Demski JS, 1991). The two parties are supposed to invest in 
sequence. A convertible allows a switch of ownership in the middle so that each investing party 
becomes the sole owner when it is his/her turn to invest. Efficiency can be achieved under the 
double moral hazard since the sole owner has the incentive to invest efficiently. The venture 
capitalist will not want to get involved in the daily operation of the firm, as they neither have the 
technical expertise nor the managerial personnel to run a number of companies in diverse 
industries. However they want to participate in the strategic decisions of the firm. Hence the 
venture capitalist will usually demand a representation in the board of directors of the firm. Only 
when the situation is unfavourable or the firm is not performing then the venture capitalist will 
take control of the firm.  
Baker and Wurgler‟s (2002) (Baker M, 2002) study shows that low leverage firms are those that 
raised funds when their market valuations were high, and vice versa. That is, the manager of the 
firm acts like a fund manager who manages the firm‟s financial assets like an investment. The 
most popular strategy that is employed by investors is to set performance targets or milestones to 
take certain specified actions (Sahlman 1990). 
 
In the world of intense competition and uncertainty some degree of mutual cooperation between 
entrepreneur and venture capitalist is necessary for the successful performance of the portfolio 
company. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists each specialize in the development and 
contribution of different types of knowledge called as knowledge specificity which allows each 
party to exploit its comparative advantage. The venture capitalists' business networks allow them 
to tap funds more cheaply than entrepreneurs. Whereas entrepreneur specializes in day to day 
development of business activities and are alert at unexploited opportunities and has working 
knowledge of combining all resource to exploit those opportunities (Cable, 1997). To create large 
scale successful new ventures requires entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to work together.  
Research on this cooperation decision, The Prisoner's Dilemma framework was developed by 
Cable and Shane (1997) which appears to provide an effective approach for understanding 
entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationships. The model is used by Cable (1997) to generate a 
number of testable propositions concerning long term cooperation between entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists. 
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2.7 Prisoner’s Dilemma approach 
 
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-known and it models situations of social conflict between two 
or more interdependent actors. The essence of the dilemma is that each individual actor has an 
incentive to act according to competitive, narrow self-interest even though all actors are 
collectively better off (i.e., receive higher rewards) if they cooperate.  
 
Earlier research on entrepreneur-venture capital relationship has applied agency theory 
concentrating on the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection. However this theory does not 
incorporate the opportunistic behaviour both the venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma approach incorporates both issues of uncertainty and goal conflict which 
underlie agency theory. It also addresses social relationship that develop between the entrepreneur 
and the venture capitalist which is very critical. 
                                       C2                                      D2 
 
 
                C1 
 
 
                D1 
 
                                                         T > R > P > S 
C = Cooperate, D = Defect, T = Temptation, R = Reward,  P = Punishment, S = Sucker‟s payoff. 
 
Fig.1  2X2 Payoff Matrix for prisoner‟s Dilemma 
 
As shown in the figure 1 above both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist strategies can be 
summarized as cooperation where they both seek mutual gains at the expense of short-term self-
interest and defection where they seek individual gains at the expense of long-term mutual 
benefit. The payoff will be as per the strategies adopted by the other and follows the payoff 
structure T> R> P> S. T represents the temptation of extra payoff from defection; R represents the 
reward for mutual cooperation; P signifies the penalty for mutual defection; and S represents the 
sucker's payoff (the penalty for cooperating while the other actor defects). 
The cooperation between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist is critical for the success of 
their relationship, however there is an argument against it and the research indicates that 
cooperation is far from ubiquitous (Sahlman, 1990).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
R,R 
 
S,T 
 
T,S 
 
P,P 
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2.7.1 Mutual Defection Decisions 
 
The Prisoner‟s Dilemma exits for both parties and there is an increase in the higher short term 
payoff for defection than cooperation irrespective of others action that is, unless both defect 
(Cable, 1997). The motivation behind defection can be linked to uncertainty which includes 
unpredictable market conditions, project related uncertainty. Mainly two factors are considered 
for either party to go for defection strategy. First is the opportunity cost for both the entrepreneur 
and the venture capitalist because both parties have limited resources and selection of one project 
incurs cost of not selecting other project. Defection incentive for venture capitalist is very high as 
they constantly look for new opportunities and seek to maximize financial returns. Second is the 
asymmetric information about the project which leads both entrepreneur and venture capitalist to 
make some subjective evaluation of the future performance. Knowledge specificity for both 
parties can lead to defection  as it provide a short term payoff to the party which defects while the 
other continues to cooperates.  
 
2.7.2 Entrepreneur’s defection decision 
 
Entrepreneur‟s have long recognized the importance of cooperating with the venture capitalist, 
but multiple defection temptation still exists. According to Sapienza and Korsgaard (Sapienza, 
1996) entrepreneurs have personal incentives to withhold or alter critical information this is 
because at the initial stage of their relationship with the venture capitalist, the entrepreneur is 
hesitant and does not want to give away all the technical details about the project. Unfortunately 
the entrepreneurs who give away all the information are not protected by Intellectual property law 
and they can make the information about exploiting the opportunities public information as 
venture capitalist refuse to sign a non disclosure agreement and usually distribute business plans 
among their network. This is one of the reason why the entrepreneur may defect by holding back 
the information about the technology to protect themselves against the opportunistic venture 
capitalist, however the venture capitalist cannot make sound investment decision at later phase in 
project. 
Apart from holding back information the entrepreneur may be tempted  to overstate their 
performance to increase chance to receive as much funding as possible as the investment is 
directly related to the projection. More the funding acquired by an entrepreneur sends out a 
positive signals in market about the firm. Hence in order to get short term rewards of the high 
initial investment the entrepreneur will tend to manipulate the information. In the similar way 
entrepreneur tend to hide the negative information about a firm‟s performance. Consequently 
Entrepreneur‟s defection decision to have short term gain at expense of the venture capitalist can 
damage venture‟s ultimate success if poor decision results from inaccurate information and 
effectively ruin the entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationship. Entrepreneurial venture demands 
high level of commitment, promises of dedication and achievement that are made at the start for 
securing the investment becomes less attractive if the venture demands constant attention , also 
entrepreneur might focus on the development of a venture's technology at the expense of financial 
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performance to satisfy ego needs (Steier & Greenwood, 1995). Defection may be the temptation 
when entrepreneur using investor‟s money. Often the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have 
different views about the best use of resources; lavish company cars and meals that entrepreneurs 
perceive as deserved may be viewed as frivolous expenditure by venture capitalists. Researchers 
have noted misuse of capital is very costly to venture capitalists but not necessarily to 
entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneur face paradox between mutual cooperation and defection and as noted by Amit,  
Glosten, & Muller "The entrepreneur is likely in many cases to choose actions that are consistent 
with his own best interests but inconsistent with the venture capitalist's interests." 
 
2.7.3 Venture Capitalist defection decision 
 
The venture capitalists are faced with many temptations to defect from the mutual cooperation. 
This temptation can be the cause of the venture capitalist arrangement of distribution of limited  
partnerships which specify that limited partners receive returns on their investments before the 
venture capitalists secure a profit (Sahlman, 1990). Due to this they are tempted to harvest the 
profit and defer the future investment in a project potentially limiting the future growth of the 
venture. 
Researchers in this area clearly shows that the misuse of capital is more costly to the venture 
capitalists than entrepreneurs hence the venture capitalists seek to provide the minimum 
investment required. This low investment strategy may benefit the venture capitalists who are 
diversified (venture capitalist invest in number of portfolio company) but it will be unfortunate 
for the entrepreneurs that are undiversified and their financial returns solely depends upon the 
success of the single venture.  
Venture capitalists also have an incentive to defect for the short term benefit in terms of the time 
spend by them in each venture. As Sahlman (Sahlman, 1990) noted, "The venture investors visit 
each portfolio company an average of 19 times per year and spend 100 hours in direct contact (on 
site or by phone) with the company”. The venture capitalists have their annual targets of number 
of companies in which they invest and the total amount invested. The venture capitalist cannot 
allocate time and effort like formulation of the strategy, introduction to clients in all of the 
ventures in the portfolio hence venture capitalist refrain from providing best inputs for each 
venture. However, as venture capitalists diversify risk by diffusing time and tacit knowledge 
between multiple ventures; this can be interpreted as a defection strategy by individual 
entrepreneurs who have invested all of their resources in their specific venture. This will 
undermine the entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationship and reducing the value of the venture.  
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2.7.4 Mutual cooperation between Entrepreneur and venture capitalist 
 
As discussed in the previous section there are multiple and frequent temptation for both the 
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist to defect at the expense of mutual cooperation. The 
question is how can the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist structure their relationship to 
maximize cooperation and minimize defection? There are many conditions that lead to 
cooperation however they do not have same effect on both entrepreneur and venture capitalist and 
these conditions tend to change over time.  
Daniel and Scott (Cable, 1997) develop propositions concerning the differential effects of the 
factors on entrepreneurs versus venture capitalists. The variables and its effects can be 
summarized as below 
 
 
Variable 
Differential Effects 
Entrepreneur Venture Capitalist 
Time Pressure           **              * 
Pay-off of cooperation           **              * 
Information: Communication            *             ** 
                     Social Relationship           **              * 
Personal Similarity: Relative Power            *              * 
                     Relational demography            *              * 
                   Work values congruence            *              * 
Transactional Procedures: Generosity            *              * 
                               Bonding mechanism            *              * 
                            Staging capital payout            *              * 
                  Penalties for noncooperation           **              * 
 
Note: * denotes the expected positive relationship 
 
Many researchers like Williamson, O (Williamson, 1975) have assumed that unregulated 
competition between self-interested individuals enhances individual benefits and societal value 
hence supporting defection strategy. Other scholars Granovetter (Granovetter, 1985) have 
discussed situations in which mutual cooperation is better for all participants than the tendency of 
individuals to maximize short-term individual self-interest hence supporting the cooperating 
strategy. Daniel supports the argument by Granovetter and point out that agency model is not 
appropriate to investigate the entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationships.  
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3. Model 
 
Consider a new venture whose financing decisions are determined by venture capitalist and the 
venture is managed by the entrepreneur where the firm is faced with uncertainty. The venture is 
being financed in stages assume that between two consecutive financing rounds the market value 
of the venture V follows a geometric Brownian motion:  
 
dV= αVdt +  σt VdW  
where α is the drift term, determined by the entrepreneur‟s ability and general market conditions, 
σt is the volatility term, and dW is a Wiener process. For simplicity, α is assumed to be constant. 
 
3.1 Assumptions 
 
Assume three fixed time period t=0, T1 and T2 where t< T1<T2. At t=0 venture is run out of 
money and require financing for its operation. At T2 the assets become tangible and venture 
capitalist can sell most of its share. Suppose venture is financed in two ways  
1) Staged financing where Is is financed at t=0 and K at t=T1  
2) Lump-sum financing where total amount is I1= Is + e
-rT1
K at t=0; r is risk free interest rate. 
 
The venture is in the early stage and risky hence no other finance is provided from the market 
except from the venture capitalist. If the venture capitalist refuses the finance the value of firm is 
drop to zero. σt  is the riskiness of the venture during time 0-T2, once the initial investment is 
provided entrepreneur determines the level of the venture‟s riskiness during (0, T1), σ1, where σ1 
is some constant. If the venture does not become bankrupt at time T1, its riskiness during (T1, 
T2), σ2, will be kσ1, where k is a positive coefficient. At T1 market uncertainty is resolved up to 
certain level hence the riskiness is reduced. σ2 is much smaller than σ1   and k is assumed closer to 
1.  
 
3.2 Analyzing staging decision 
 
3.2.1 Valuing compound option with multiple volatilities 
 
If the staged finance is provided at t=0 then venture represents a compound call option to venture 
capitalist. Geske (1979) derives a formula for valuing compound options. 
Theory 1: consider a compound option which gives venture capitalist the right to pay the exercise 
price K at t=0 to get a call option which later can be exercised at T2 by paying M. Suppose the 
value of firm V follows a Brownian motion 
dV= αVdt +  σ1VdW  between (0,T1) and 
dV= αVdt +  σ2VdW  between (T1, T2) where σ1 ,  σ2  and α are constant in given time period. 
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Using Geske derived formula the value of the compound option at time t  
 
 
 
r is the risk free rate, τ1 = T1 - t, τ2 = T2 - T1, τ = T2 - t = τ1 + τ2 
 
As per the equation (4) venture capitalist is justified for further investment of K at T1 and 
obtaining a call option at T2 only when the VT1 exceeds the threshold   
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3.2.2 Valuation of simple option with multiple volatilities 
 
In the case of lump-sum investment made by venture capitalist have a simple call option. Here 
there is two distinct volatility over the life of the option and Black Scholes formula can be used. 
 
Theory 2: Using the same assumption simple call option can be exercised only after the time 
period T2 by paying amount M.  
The value of option at time t  
 
 
 
r is the risk free rate, τ1 = T1 - t, τ2 = T2 - T1, τ = T2 - t = τ1 + τ2 
 
 
3.2.3 Incentives of Venture capitalist and entrepreneur 
 
Venture capitalist make the investment at t=0 and the net value of the investment NV is defined as 
value of real option-cost incurred to make the investment. Therefore  
 
NV1 = S – I1 for lump-sum financing 
 
NV = C – Is for staged financing 
 
Venture capitalist is the value maximiser hence they choose the investment where NV is highest 
and positive; whereas entrepreneur choose σ1 to maximize the probability to get financing in next 
round. 
Venture capitalists invest in several portfolio companies and the performance of the fund manager 
depends on the monetary value of the overall investment in the portfolio companies. The failure 
of one venture does not make much difference to the overall monetary value. Entrepreneur 
maximizes the expected return of the investment however it is very difficult for the entrepreneur 
to make objective valuation of return and cost and subjective valuation can easily vary a great 
deal. Hence entrepreneur is probability-maximiser instead of a value-maximiser as the subjective 
judgement of probability is more accurate.  
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3.3 Analysis of riskiness of the project 
 
To analyse how risky is the project we assume that venture capitalists go for next round of 
funding after the initial investment. In lump-sum financing the project receive the next round of 
funding at t=T2 and for staged financing project receive funding at t=T1. 
Proposition 1: Venture capitalist are value maximisers and under the assumption that the value of 
firm follows a Brownian motion as shown in (1) and (2) the probability of the value of firm is 
greater than the initial value at t=T2 with their total funding M at t=0 
Pr (VT2 ≥ M) 
Using the same assumption as made earlier σ2 = kσ1  , σ1≤  σ2  ≤  σu   are all positive constant.  
Outcome 1:  Yao-Wen Hsu (Hsu, 2008) derives the following conditions 
1) V0e
ατ
 is maximized at σ1   
 
2) Pr (VT2 ≥ M) is maximized at σ1 = σ2  if M < V0e
ατ
 
 
This shows that the value of σ1 is restricted between σ1 and σu  if the expected value V0e
ατ 
 at t=T2 
to be more than investment M. Hence Entrepreneur tend to undertake riskless activities to secure 
the funding.   
 Outcome 2: Let Pr (VT1 ≥ ) such that the value of firm is V0 at t=0 and at t=T1 the value of 
the firm  will be positive and greater than V0. Then Yao-Wen Hsu (Hsu, 2008) shows 
 
 
 
 
Using the above outcomes we can plot risk vs. probability with different values of V0 to find the 
probability of the entrepreneur receiving funding in subsequent round. (Hsu, 2008) 
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 Fig 1. Probability of subsequent financing. 
Fig 1 shows the riskiness of the project to the probability of securing finance in subsequent round. 
Where Ps represents the probability of the staged financing which is Pr (VT1 ≥ ). PI represents 
the probability of lump-sum financing which is Pr (VT2 ≥ M) as explained above.  
Using fig1 we can show how entrepreneur chooses the riskiness of the first period of project. 
Assuming σ1  = 30% and   σu = 120% . As seen in fig 1, Ps   and PI curves reduce as the risk 
increases.  
In case 1 when V0 is as small (V0 =0.4) the probability of securing finance increases with risk 
hence entrepreneur tend to choose higher risk of σu =120%  
In case 2 when the V0 is very large (V0 =12) the probability of securing finance reduces when the 
risk is increasing. Hence entrepreneur tend to choose the least possible risk of σ1 = 30% for 
securing the finance in the subsequent round. 
In case 3 when the V0 is intermediate (V0 = 6), the entrepreneur tend to choose the risk depending 
upon the type of financing to maximize the probability of their survival and to secure subsequent 
financing. 
  
1 
2 
3 
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3.4 Analyse whether lump-sum or staged finance  
 
Proposition 2: When venture capitalist decides to provide a lump-sum financing 
Riskiness (σ1) of the venture between time (0,T1) as analyzed by Yao-Wen Hsu 
                        
The Net value of lump-sum financing NV1 will be       
                
 
Proposition 3: If the venture capitalist decides to go for staged financing then, 
Riskiness of the project (σ1s) during time (0,T1) as summarized by Yao-Wen Hsu will be the 
value between (σ1, σu) such that  
                       can be maximized where satisfies  
 
  
The net value of the staged financing NVs  
  
 
Staged Financing in Venture capital market                                                                Student ID: 4089603 
 
22 
 
 
3.5 Determinants of staged financing 
 
We will use the typical value of the parameters in the model to investigate which factors affect 
staged financing decision. We first analyse the effect of stage financing on the net value of the 
project and to find conditions in which staged financing is preferred. 
We use the parameter as below 
Is= £ 0.5 Million, K = £ 0.5 Million, M = £ 4 Million, r = 4%, α = - 10% 
σ1 = 30% , σu = 120% , k = 0.7 ,  τ1 = 1 year ,  τ2 = 1.5 years.  
 
3.6 Effect of staging 
 
We can use preposition 1 and 2 venture‟s riskiness in first period and the net values.   
Considering V0 at 6 and the venture capitalist chooses staged financing where they invest £ 0.5 
Million at t=0 we can use preposition 3 to find the riskiness that entrepreneur will undertake σ1s = 
125.7% to maximize the £ 0.5 Million at t=1year. The net value at t=0, NVs  is about £0.279 
Million. 
When the venture capitalist chooses lump-sum financing that requires the investment of  £ 4 
Million then by applying preposition 2 we can find the riskiness of the first period at t= 1+1.5 = 
2.5 years is σ11= 86.8%  and the Net value at t=0 , NV1 is - £ 2.19Million.  
We can see the difference between NVs  and NV1  as the effect of staging. The only difference 
between staged financing and lump-sum financing is that the venture capitalist can delay the 
decision of investing of K until time T1.  
The staged financing has two effects: 
 1) The venture capitalist can change the option to compound option in staged financing whereas 
it is a simple option in lump-sum financing.  
2) The venture capitalist can induce entrepreneur to take different level of risk.   
The compound effect in staged financing will change a simple option to a compound option and 
will change the net value of investment opportunities keeping the riskiness of the project 
unchanged. Riskiness effect in staged financing will change the net value of the investment for 
the different level of risk keeping the type of option unchanged.   
Staged Financing in Venture capital market                                                                Student ID: 4089603 
 
23 
 
In the model analyzed by Yao-Wen Hsu, the entrepreneur does respond to the delayed infusion of 
capital K and chooses different first-period riskiness for different types of financing. Typically, 
delaying the commitment of capital K induces the entrepreneur to choose a higher first-period 
riskiness, 31 so the claim value of the venture capitalist‟s real option is further enhanced by the 
riskiness effect. This suggests that staging can also mitigate the agency problem, which occurs 
when the entrepreneur would otherwise undertake less risky activities (Hsu, 2008) . 
When the value of V0 is low, entrepreneur will select riskiness as σu , no matter if the project is 
financed using stage financing or lump-sum financing. When the value of V0 is high than there is 
no riskiness effect exists. When the value of V0 is intermediate than entrepreneur choose the 
riskiness depending on the type of financing hence both riskiness effect and compounding effect 
exists when stage financing is used by venture capitalist. 
 
3.7 Parameters effecting the Venture capitalist staging decision 
 
The effect of staging NVs  - NV1  is positive which means the net value of staged financing is 
greater than the net value of lump-sum financing, however this does not mean staged financing is 
better than lump-sum financing as the cost of staging is not included in the calculation of NVs. 
The cost of staging comprises of the assessment cost of decision making in the additional round 
of financing however it is very difficult to estimate the cost of staging. The decision made by the 
venture capitalist is based on the information gathering through their participation in the venture; 
hence the cost cannot be estimated. To get the rough estimate of the staging cost the following 
data can be considered: 
1) The average compensation of a managing partner of a private, independent venture-
capital firm in the USA was US $437,000 in 1987 (Sahlman, 1990, p. 495).  
2)  A venture capital fund with US $200 million in committed capital is typically 
managed by a professional staff numbering between 6 and 12, together with 
administrative support personnel (Sahlman 1990, p. 488).  
3)  The average time between two financing rounds is about 1 year (Gompers 1995, 
Table V).  
4)  The venture capitalists spend roughly half of their time monitoring an average of nine 
portfolio companies (Gorman and Sahlman 1989).  
5) The evaluation process of an investment proposal takes on average 129.5 working 
hours (Fried and Hisrich 1994, p. 31).  
6) The venture capitalists spend 25% of their time serving as directors and monitors, 15% 
acting as consultants, 5% selecting opportunities, 5% analyzing business plans, 5% 
negotiating investments, and 45% undertaking other activities (Zider 1998, p. 137). 
As summarized by Yao-Wen Hsu (Hsu, 2008) lower the volatility α , the venture capitalist tend to 
stage their financing as the effect staging is more likely to outweigh the cost of staging. 
Considering V0 = 12 and the cost of financing is £500K  
When α = -25% the venture capitalist should choose staged financing because the benefit of 
staging will be more than the cost of financing. 
When α = 25% the venture capitalist should choose lump-sum financing because the cost of 
financing will be more than the effect of staging.  
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We can contradict the statement by Yao-Wen Hsu saying the lower value of α does not 
necessarily induces staging. If α is high due to the entrepreneur‟s good ability or booming 
economy the net value of the venture may grow rapidly and value of VT1  increases great deal. 
Under this circumstance staged financing loses its value and venture capitalist should provide 
lump-sum financing. If α is low which means the prospect for venture capitalist is low and they 
should maintain “wait and see” strategy by staging their investment.  
Staging decision is not affected by risk free rate (r). As described in all the real option literature 
the investment decision is usually more sensitive to volatility than it is to the interest rate. 
 
Staging decision of the venture capitalist is also undertaken if they have high degree of control 
over the venture. The value to the real option will be higher if the entrepreneur undertake riskier 
activities. However the argument about the agency concern makes the entrepreneur undertake less 
risky activities to secure the finance from venture capitalist in the subsequent round of financing. 
Hence the venture capitalist tackles this issue by having tighter control on entrepreneur‟s decision 
making.  
 
4. Discussions   
 
In the earlier sections, it has been seen how stage-financing can play a crucial role in benefitting 
the venture capitalists, and it has also been discovered how important convertibles are, in giving 
the venture capitalists with the value that they expect. The essence of stage-financing can be 
emphasized with a few perspectives such as Real Options as evidently proven earlier. Venture 
capitalists are faced with choice of investing or delaying. For the real option perspective venture 
capitalist needs to decide whether to hold the option or invest now and get a future option to 
invest later. These timing decision are depended on the factors that influence the economic value 
of the two options. The factors affecting the decision are market uncertainty, competition as 
discussed in above section. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) state that when the venture capitalist 
retains the option to abandon the project, the entrepreneur/founder then has the motivation of 
engaging in Window-dressing and positively bias the short-term performance of the project, 
reducing the likelihood that it will be liquidated. Prisioner‟s dilemma approach highlights the 
factors affecting the relationship between entrepreneur and venture capitalist. This approach 
implies that the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist should increase the information exchange 
and transactional procedures to promote mutual cooperation. In addition Dawes (1980) states that 
the social relationship foster trust and generosity which increase the probability of mutual 
cooperation however Sapienza (1989) argue that some parties keep the business relationship 
strictly formal. Another argument from Schuessler, 1989 says that self induced cooperation 
between egoistic individual is very unstable and stress on the need for external governing bodies. 
In reality the relationship between entrepreneur and venture capitalist is a complex interaction 
between managers, directors and network of investors and prisioners dilemma approach fail to 
explain that.  Cornelli and Yoha (2003) explain that a properly engineered convertible security 
would prevent such behaviour since the window-dressing aspect would make it more probable 
that the venture capitalist would exercise the conversion option consequently ending up owning a 
considerable amount of the project‟s equity himself/herself.  
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4.1 Stage-financing and different perspectives 
 
It has been noticed that the financing trends have shown interesting contrasts through their 
venture capital deals. In China for instance, it has on occasion been shown that investments may 
be made in small investments based on larger milestones in larger deals.  There would also be 
need for deeper due diligence for those investment types like the chipset company deals.  More 
control over actions of the company with a greater number of protective provisions that required 
preferred stock approval such as budget approval, excess budget spend, drag-along right,  and so 
on (Greguras, 2006).  
Fundamentally staged financing is meant to be reducing or hedging risk for an investor, the stage-
financing techniques involve the company doling out the shares to the investor as money is 
received (growco.com 23/09/09) 
 From a financial Engineering perspective, dynamic allocation of rights between the investing and 
financing sides of the Venture Capitalists contract under a Real Options model is analyzed to be 
found that stag financing could provide with nodes for carrying out the real options evaluation by 
the Risk-neutral valuation method and explaining the decision path by dynamic rights allocation 
analysis (Jingyun and Fengming, 2008). It is often been stated by many researchers have 
measured the advantages with the help of determinant variables to help prove the advantages of 
Real options in stage financing as compared to Lump-sum financing. This is analyzed in the 
previous sections that the robustness of these determinants under various conditions of risk and 
uncertainty in markets needs greater examination.  
In depth research is carried out in the different stages of financing, as has been investigated in the 
literature review. Neher (1997) argues for stage financing states that upfront financing may be 
advantageous and efficient but nevertheless, but can be infeasible in some cases since the founder 
cannot renegotiate down the outside investor‟s claim once she‟s sunk her investment. To 
overcome this problem of committing earlier, stage financing is used and consequently the earlier 
rounds of investments are used to create collateral that can support the later rounds (Neher, 1997). 
Neher therefore discusses that in the venture capital market, the gradual embodiment of the 
entrepreneur‟s Human Capital in the physical venture capital is a good driver of the staged 
investment, hence signifying the need for each new stage of financing to coincide with new 
considerable advancement in the venture, like the receipt of a new patent, which is a way in which 
the human capital of the entrepreneur gets embedded into physical venture capital. 
4.2 Limitations of Real options’ support for stage financing 
 
Neher (2008) observes that it is very unclear that the real options model would share his model‟s 
interpretation of stage finance which talks of the personification of human capital into physical 
capital. Also real options analysis would require a specification that needs to be accurate to 
determine the process in which the uncertainty is resolved.  Thus it is argued by this research 
author that a real option model is simply a model of investment under uncertainty which does not 
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address the agency problem that encapsulates the issues surrounding the aims of the venture 
capitalist and the entrepreneur. Real options theory can be applied to study venture capital since 
venture capital investments, like R&D investments, involve managerial discretion and are long 
term investments fraught with uncertainty (Li et al., 2007). Future real options research can shed 
light on not only investment and staging decisions, but also contracting and valuation in venture 
capital. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the paper we used real options and the prisoner‟s dilemma approach to analyse the venture 
capital‟s staging decision. Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are faced by uncertainty and 
competitive pressures. The real option framework deals with uncertainty in a satisfactory way and 
we demonstrated how staged financing can be used as an investment strategy by venture capitalist 
firms. For the financing strategy, convertibles are the most popular financial instrument especially 
in early stage of a firm‟s development and in the case of a firm with high risk and ample potential. 
There are various studies, which justify the use of convertibles in staged financing.  However the 
success of a venture is largely dependent on the quality of the human capital involved especially 
if the venture is highly uncertain. An entrepreneur‟s ability and effort is critical for the success of 
the venture. The major concern for the venture‟s success is the agency problem. An asymmetric 
information approach highlights all the major concerns and we used the prisoner‟s dilemma 
approach to show the entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationship. There is a need for 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to understand the factors influencing their relationship. As 
the uncertainty and competition for a good investment increases rapidly it is very critical to 
increase the level and quality of the information transfer between entrepreneur and venture 
capitalist. The relationship between entrepreneur and venture capitalist can be developed by 
increasing information exchange, transactional procedures and social relationship. As discussed in 
the argument about knowledge specificity between venture capitalist and entrepreneur, venture 
capital firm must differentiate between exogenous market uncertainty and endogenous project-
specific uncertainty or behavioural uncertainty, to the extent that they have different implications 
for the staging decision. Venture capitalist are value maximiser‟s as they tend to hedge their risk 
by investing in number of portfolio companies and the success of a venture capital firm is not 
depended on the success of one portfolio company. Staged financing can further reduce the risk of 
the investment and mitigate agency problem as we showed in the real option analysis. In 
particular, staged financing induces a higher effort from the entrepreneur. However, for less 
promising ventures, upfront financing may be a socially better choice, since initial 
underinvestment by the venture capitalist may overkill a viable venture. 
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